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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal' placed
a squeeze on the once touted liberal Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by
requiring judges to consider the veracity of potential plaintiffs' federal
claims in light of Iqbal's new heightened pleading standard. This article
examines post-Iqbal pleading standards across United States jurisdictions
and argues that states should exert caution before choosing to adopt Iqbal's
new "plausibility" standard, and if they elect to modify their pleading
standards in light of the Iqbal decision, they should also carefully
contemplate their method of adoption.
The Supreme Court's overhaul of federal pleading doctrine has
caused confusion among lower courts due to the Iqbal decision's

*
J.D., University of Miami School of Law, BA, University of Southern California. I would like to
thank Professor Charlton Copeland for his help with this project I would also like to extend a special thank
you to Professor Anthony V. Alfieri for inspiring my interest in Civil Procedure.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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ambiguity and lack of precedent. As such, states should exercise restraint
before adopting Iqbal's model as their own. Part II of this article identifies
the Supreme Court's swift departure from the backbone of the Federal
Rules, by abandoning the traditional "notice" pleading requirement and
replacing it with a vague "plausibility" standard. Part III examines the
relationship between federal and state civil procedural systems and
demonstrates that states are under no obligation to follow the Federal
Rules, but have adopted them into state procedural systems primarily out
of comity. Part IV then explores the lack of uniformity of pleading
standards across state jurisdictions since the Iqbal decision. Finally, Part V
argues states should retain their unique pleading standards and be weary
of adopting Iqbal's plausibility pleading standard because the new standard
will encounter substantial problems in determining the sufficiency of a
complaint.
II. "IF IT AIN'T BROKE DON'T Fix IT"
Every civil action in federal court commences upon the plaintiff filing
a complaint. Prior to the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly,2 there was minimal consideration of the requirements
for this initial step. And why should there have been? The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provide for a relatively simple process requiring that a
plaintiffs complaint contain only "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." According to the appendix
to the Rules, the language "short and plain" literally means what it says.4
In Conley v. Gibson,' the Supreme Court promulgated the standard for
pleading vis-A-vis a motion to dismiss.' Conley's simple formula became
quickly ingrained as a liberal mechanism within federal pleading
Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562-63 (2007) (rejecting the low pleading standard set
forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), and adopting heightened pleading standards).
2

3

FED.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

See FED.R. Civ. P. Form 11. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain an example ofwhat a
"short and plain" statement should entail: "On <Date>, at <Place>, the defendant negligently drove a
motor vehicle against the plaintiff." Id.; see also Robert G. Bone, PlausibilityPleading Revisiie and Revised A
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L REV. 849, 861 (2010) (opposing the notion of plausibility
pleading by using Form 11 as determinative ofa sufficient complaint).
s
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief").
6
For a general overview of the motion to dismiss and its operation in response to a plaintiffs
complaint see Charles Alan Wright ET AL., Motions to Dismiss - Practice Under Rule 12(b)(6), 5B FEDERAL
PRACTCE & PROCEDURE 5 1357 (3d ed. 2011).
4
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doctrine,7 allowing plaintiffs to easily gain access to the discovery phase of
litigation without the need for an extensive preliminary investigation to
provide evidentiary support for their pleadings.'
Prior to the Twombly decision, Conley was the "fourth-most cited
decision by the federal courts."' Under Conley, Rule 8(a)(2) required only
that a plaintiff provide "notice" to the defending party of the claims that
were being asserted against it.o Litigants across the board understood that
even the most unembellished complaint would typically survive a motion
to dismiss and as such, the motion to dismiss was used sparingly (and
perhaps more legitimately) by defendants under the oft-cited Conley
standard." The Supreme Court's decision in Twombly threw fifty years of
settled law into pandemonium by declaring that pure notice was

7
The Rules Enabling Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. SS 2071 - 2077, allowed for the promulgation of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the purpose of which was to abolish the strict forms of common law
pleading.
8
Although the purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6), the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose other requirements on a plaintiffs
pleadings before access to discovery is granted. Rule 8(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to establish federal
subject matter jurisdiction and Rule 8(a)(3) requires the plaintiff to state the relief sought. Pleadings
are also subject to other requirements such as process and service under Rule 4. Arguably, Rule 11 is
another threshold that a plaintiff bears in filing a complaint. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C.
Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IowA L. REv. 821, 849 (2010) ("[O]ne could have less
disruptively attained an equivalent of the Twombly and Iqbal regime by aggressively rereading Rule
11 rather than Rule 8."); see also Benjamin P. Cooper, Iqbal's Retro Revolution, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REv.937 (Winter 2011) (comparing the rationale behind the Iqbal decision to the 1983 amendment to
Rule 11).
9
Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble With Twombly: A Proposed Pleading StandardFor Employment
DiscriminationCases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 1011, 1017 (2009).
1o
See Bone, supra note 4, at 853 (arguing that under notice pleading the sole function of a complaint
was to give fair notice to the defendant of what the dispute was generally about).
1"
Dismissal is granted pursuant to a defendant's motion to dismiss under FED. R Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Where a motion to dismiss was likely denied by a District Court following Conley, a component of a defending
party's litigation strategy would be to move for a "more definite statement of a pleading." FED.RCIV.P. 12(e).
Since the motion to dismiss was difficult to obtain under Conley, a more definite statement served to provide
the defendant with the "notice" necessary to proceed with pleading the answer. The ability of a defendant to
require a plaintiff to provide more information regarding a particular claim is consistent with the concept of
notice pleading under Conely. One major theme that is echoed throughout scholarship following Twornbly
and Ibal are the potential conflicts within the Federal Rules due to the Supreme Court's rewriting of the
relationship between FED. R CIv. P. 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6). The Rules were written to be interdependent and
function uniformly. By radically changing one section of the Rules without conforming the others to the
change, makes the functionality of procedure in the federal courts questionable. See, e.g., SujaA Thomas, The
New SummaryJudgmentMotion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbaland Twombly, 14 LEwIS & CLARK L. REv. 15
(2010) (demonstrating the merging of Rules 12(b)(6) and 56).
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insufficient for initiating civil claims in federal courts." The holding in
Twombly dismissed the plaintiffs claims because they were not
"plausible,"" leaving later district courts and parties alike to determine
what the new standard of "plausibility" actually required."
Whatever uncertainty existed with regard to the breadth of Twombly's
holding" was put to rest in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.16 The issue in Iqbal
contemplated whether conclusory statements could sustain a Bivens
action," but the Court's decision went well beyond those unique facts. It
not only magnified the burden on plaintiffs," but clarified that the
"plausibility" standard is applicable to all civil actions. 9
Iqbal's holding articulates that two important principals must be
utilized by a district judge when ruling on a motion to dismiss: (1) legal
conclusions contained in the complaint are not entitled to the
presumption of truth; and (2) factual allegations contained therein must
be nudged "across the line from conceivable to plausible."2 0 To
successfully rebut a motion to dismiss, Iqbal requires that plaintiffs state
factual matter that a court would not read as a legal conclusion. A
plaintiffs bare legal conclusions will not be given any weight when faced

12
For fifty years Conley's "no set of facts" formula was the standard for a motion to dismiss. See
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The upheaval caused by Twombly was indeed sudden,
considering that Supreme Court jurisprudence had been unflinching in upholding the Conley standard into
the early 2000s. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (holding civil rights complaint
need not contain greater particularity, merely a short plain statement).
13
See Bell Al. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The court determined that "stating a
claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter..." and requiring "plausible grounds does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence" of the claim asserted. Id.
14
See Seiner, supra note 9, at 1014.
1
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (2007). Twmbly was a complicated antitrust case and the thrust of
legal debate following the decision focused on whether the decision would be applied broadly or would be
limited to the antitrust context. See, e.g., Seiner, supra note 9, at 1021-22 ("Twombly arose at the complete
opposite end of the spectrum ... complex antitrust litigation.").
16
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (finding dismissal proper when complaint does not plead
plausible facts on its face).
17
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ashcfi, 554 U.S. 902 (No. 07-1015); see aLso Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (holding that damages
may be obtained for violation of civil rights by a federal official).
1
See Bone, supra note 4, at 858 ("It is highly significant that Justices Souter and Breyer
dissented in Iqbal. Both were with the majority in Twombly. Moreover, Justice Souter, who wrote the
principal dissenting opinion in Iqbal, actually authored the majority opinion in Twombly. These are
strong signs that Iqbal is notjust a straightforward application of Twombly.").
19
Iqbal, 550 U.S. at 684.
20
See id. at 683 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
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with a motion to dismiss. At the same time, the plaintiff must also state
its complaint with adequate conciseness and profusion in order to
convince the court of its claim's plausibility. Although heightened
pleading existed prior to Twombly, 2' notably when alleging fraud,' the
Court's abrogation of Conley was severe because previously, federal courts
uniformly applied Conley notice pleading to the vast majority of civil
actions.2
The departure from notice pleading has been met with confusion and
discontent,24 prompting congressional legislation demanding the return of
Conley standards. 25 This article does not recommend an alternative to
plausibility pleading, 26 it merely identifies the deficiencies of the new rule
and the flawed process by which it came about in order to serve as a
warning to states so as to prevent their rules of civil procedure from falling
into the plausibility conundrum. The Iqbal decision bestowed a new
"gatekeeping" 27 power upon district judges, requiring that they determine
the probability of success of a case at the outset of litigation. Upon a
timely motion to dismiss, a district judge must determine whether the

21
Although the thrust of scholarly work pertains to the radical approach taken by the court in
Twombly, some commentators assert that pre-Twombly notice pleading was not as straightforward as
suggested in Conley. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIz. L. REV.
987, 989 (2003) (arguing that heightened pleading requirements exist in several substantive areas of
law).
2
See FED. R CIV. P. 9(b) ("[A] party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake.").
23
Seiner, supra note 9.
24
See JOSHUA CIVIN & DEBO P. ADEGBILE, RESTORING ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE IMPACT
OF IQBAL AND TWOMBLY ON FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 1 (American Constitution Society
for Law and Policy
Sept. 2010),
available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Civin%20
and%20Adegbile%20issue%20brief%20final%20%289-14-10%29.pdf ("Suddenly and without clear
necessity ... we now risk a world in which meritorious claims face 'dismissal first, trial never.'"); see
also Bone, supra note 4, at 879 (discussing the screening of civil rights as "troubling from a social point
of view.").
2
See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009). But see Michael R.
Huston, Pleading with Congress to Resist de Urge to Ovemnde Twombly and lqbal, 109 MICH. L. REV. 415, 443
(2010) (arguing Congress should not overrule Iqbal until its long-term effects are clear).
26
This subject has been addressed in much detail by recent scholarly work. See, e.g., Robert D.
Owen & Travis Mock, The Plausibility of Pleadings After Twombly and Iqbal, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 181, 181
(2010) ("[Twombly] and [Iqbal] have ignited a firestorm ofjudicial and academic analysis.").
2
"Gatekeeping" has been the most common phrase adopted for the new duties of district
judges within the plausibility model. See, e.g., Michael Eaton, The Key to the CourthouseDoor: The Effect
of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and the Heightened Pleading Standard, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299, 314 (2011)
(quoting Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at
A10) (describing the new role for trial judges as a "skeptical judicial gatekeeper").
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facts contained in a complaint are sufficient to state a plausible claim. 28 At
this stage in the pleadings, plaintiffs are not yet permitted to take
advantage of the discovery devices contained in the Federal Rules and
often lack the information that Iqbal demands in order to withstand a
motion to dismiss.29 As a result, Iqbal mandates that a judge grant
dismissal, essentially making a determination of the success of a claim on
the merits, before plaintiffs have an opportunity to investigate and
properly allege the facts supporting their claim.
The Supreme Court crafted plausibility pleading without utilizing the
Rule-making process, which allows for study and debate before a change
Consequently, the Supreme Court's
to a Rule is put into effect."o
unilateral approach placed a heavy and often disparate burden on plaintiffs
in the early phases of litigation. The doctrinal framework established in
Twombly broadened a district judge's ability to screen meritless suits,
which is beyond the pure notice required by the Conley model."
However, Iqbal goes even further and permits the screening of not only
meritless suits, but also those that in the opinion of the district judge,
appear weak.32 These developments demonstrate the Supreme Court's
movement toward a defendant-friendly procedural system because judges
are now able to dismiss those lawsuits deemed "weak" prior to any factual
discovery by the parties. States should be hesitant to adopt the Supreme
Court's version of plausibility pleading. At the very least, states should

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) ("[A] complaint must contain sufficient fictual
2
matter."). But cf Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("A complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief"). Under Conley, a court could hypothesize about any conceivable
facts that would entitle a plaintiff to relief and the plaintiffwas not required to produce those facts to the court.
Conversely, Iqbal requires the plaintiff to produce particular facts which would create a plausible basis that the
wrongdoing alleged actually occurred. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663.
2
Compare Thomas, supra note 11, at 15 (calling into question the propriety of merging the
motion to dismiss with summary judgment), with Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How
Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61, 62 (2007)
(defending disguised summary judgments as a balance between stopping litigation too soon and
proceeding too far).
3
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 2071 - 2077. Title 28
U.S.C. S 2073(2), authorizes the Judicial Conference to appoint committees that recommend and review
changes to the existing Rules.
31
Bone, supra note 4, at 853 ("The Twombly complaint clearly satisfied [the "notice" standard]; the
defendants knew what the plaintiffs were complaining about and could easily admit or deny the allegations.
The Court held, however, that pleading standards should do more than give notice; they should also screen
for meritless suits.").
32
See id.
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leave procedural reform to a rule-making body that will expose changes to
thorough examination and debate prior to disseminating a potentially
devastating rule which has dire consequences for a party's ability to obtain
relief
III: A STATE'S ABILITY TO ADOPT A PROCEDURAL SYSTEM
INDEPENDENT FROM THE FEDERAL RULES

A. Procedure FarFrom Universal
To what extent must states adhere to the federal model of civil
procedure? One primary purpose of the Rules Enabling Act was to create
a system of uniformity in both state and federal jurisdictions throughout
However, as one might expect from America's rich
the United States.
history of federalism, states have not been entirely receptive to the Act's
uniformity objective. In fact, the Rules fell far short from universal
adherence." There is also some evidence that the Supreme Court has not
been entirely concerned with uniformity, as reflected by its passive role in
However, despite
policing the district courts' use of local rules."
procedural incongruities, at the time Twombly was decided, about half" of
the states had adopted the Conley model of procedure in their respective
jurisdictions.
The Supreme Court's unequivocal elimination of Conley notice
pleading has caused confusion in the states that follow the federal model
since they often "give great weight to the federal interpretations of the
rules."" The states that have not adopted the Federal Rules have pleading
3
Z.W. Julius Chen, Followingdhe Leader Twombly, PleadingStandarsand Procedural Uniformity, 108
COLUM. L REv. 1431, 1435-36 (2008). According to Professor Sunderland, a drafter of the Rules, "[t]he
primary purpose ... was the attainment of local uniformity in trial court practice between the state and federal
courts." Id.
3
In their 1986 landmark study, Professors Oakley and Coon were actually surprised by the low
results when they sought to determine the extent of uniformity. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The
FederalRules in State Courts: A Suney ofState CourtSystems ofCivil Procedure,61 WASH. L REv. 1367,1427 (1986)
("fewer than halfthe states").
3s
See Samuel P. Jordan, Local Ruler and dre Limits of Trans-TeritorialProcedure, 52 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 415, 417 (2010). "[Slince the introduction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 .. . the
Supreme Court has addressed local rules and local rulemaking authority" only four times. Id.
36
See Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Taking their
cues from the federal courts, 26 States and the District of Columbia utilize as their standard for dismissal of a
complaint the very language the majority repudiates: whether it appears beyond doubt that no set of facts in
support of the claim would entitle the plaintiff to relief" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
3
Chen, supra note 33, at 1439 (quoting Edwards v. Young, 486 P.2d 181, 182 (Ariz. 1971)).
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systems that vary on a spectrum from pure notice pleading to those
requiring a fact specific complaint. However, out of the states that have
not adopted the Federal Rules verbatim, many have followed federal
jurisprudence in a number of unique ways. The radical approach taken by
Iqbal is causing state courts to reevaluate their pleading standards.
Although the Rules Enabling Act's push for procedural uniformity fell
short of its goal, a uniform system of rules can provide some benefits to
courts. Federal courts are tasked with hearing substantive state law claims
in cases involving diversity jurisdiction, and conversely, state courts have
the ability to hear federal claims in cases involving concurrent jurisdiction.
A uniform system of civil procedure would facilitate the administration of
diverse substantive claims litigated in courts of various jurisdictions as
well as present simplified and reliable outcomes for parties to the
litigation. Nevertheless, when a case requires the opposing state and
federal systems to operate together it has been a complicated area of law to
reconcile."
There is, however some guidance to interpreting the opposing state
and federal choice of law methods, at least in the federal courts. State
claims brought in a federal court sitting in diversity are dictated by Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and its progeny." Conversely, when federal
substantive claims are litigated in state court, there is less of a dedicated
line of cases offering precedential guidance. What has emerged, however,
is the reverse-Erie doctrine, which dictates when federal law applies in
state court.' Although the reverse-Erie doctrine is an ambiguous concept,
it is nevertheless pertinent to the debate regarding the states' adoption of
38
See, e.g., Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (holding claim
preclusive effect of federal diversity court's ruling was governed by federal rule that in turn incorporated
forum state's law ofclaim preclusion).
39
Erie RR Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938) (holding federal courts sitting in diversity must
apply the law of the state). The Erie doctrine dictates that the general rule in a diversity case is that "federal
courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law." Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465
(1965). However, a federal court may be inclined to apply a state mode of procedure if, absent countervailing
federal concerns, the failure to apply the state standard would be "outcome determinative" to the litigation. See
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958). The applicability of the Erie doctrine
when rules of procedure are involved is complicated, and hinges on the impact of a procedural rule on
substantive law. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., PA v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010)
("A Federal Rule of Procedure is not valid in some jurisdictions and invalid in others-or valid in some cases
and invalid in others-depending upon whether its effect is to frustrate a state substantive law (or a state
procedural law enacted for substantive purposes).").
4
Kevin M. Clermont, FederalCourts, Praice& Procedure: Reene-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1,2
(2006) [hereinafter Clermont, Reverse-Erie]. Reverse-Erie is not a widely known concept and its applicability is
nowhere as concrete as traditional Erie doctrine. In fact, it "goes strangely ignored by most scholars." Id.
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the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The importance of a state's ability to dictate the outcome of
federal substantive law by applying state methods of procedure should not
be taken lightly, considering that "federal law covers a wide array of
litigation-producing activities that end up in state court."4 1
B. The Reverse-Erie Doctrine
When federal claims are litigated in state court, the state court bears
the responsibility of adjudicating claims of concurrent jurisdiction
consistent with the federal law upon which a party's cause of action is
based.42 A difficulty inherent in the federalism concept arises when
substantive federal claims are implemented through state procedural
standards. State procedural standards are often so different from federal
procedural standards that they alter a plaintiffs ability to successfully
bring a claim under federal law in a state court jurisdiction.
It has been suggested that "[s]tate and federal courts should ultimately
apply an identical [procedural] standard to federal civil claims generally"43
by using what has been labeled a "reverse-Erie" analysis." This was the
proposition supplied by Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama,4 5 in which
a plaintiff attempted to litigate a federal claim in a state jurisdiction with a
pleading standard that diverged from the federal model.'
The Court
rationalized that "the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and
reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice."47
Although state procedure was not required to be a replica of the federal
model, state practices could not defeat federal claims, at least where those
claims would have had merit in federal court.

Id.at 4.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cL 2; see
alo Clermont, Reve-Erie, supra note 40, at 25 ("[T]he Supremacy
Clause imposes on state courts a constitutional duty 'to proceed in such manner that all the substantial rights
of the parties under controlling federal law [are] protected.'").
43
Chen, supra note 33, at 1451.
4
See, e.g.,Clermont, Rewne-Erie, supra note 40.
4s
Brown v. W. Ry. ofAla., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949) (finding state practice of determining viability of
complaint cannot be used to defeat an otherwise sufficient federal claim).
4
The civil procedure of the state of Georgia required a court to view contentions contained in the
complaint "most strongly against the [plaintiff]." Chen, supra note 33, at 1445-46 (citing Bmwn v. W Ry. of
Ala., 338 U.S. 294,295 (1949)).
47
B10Wn, 338 U.S. at 299.
41
42
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Aside from Brown v. Western Railway, the Supreme Court has not been
very active in reverse-Erie doctrine.48 In Johnson v. Fankell,49 the
Supreme Court determined that "[n]either this Court nor any other
federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute
different from the one rendered by the highest court of the State."so The
Court went on to clarify that "[t]his proposition, fundamental to our
system of federalism, is applicable to procedural as well as substantive
rules."s" Accordingly, the state courts largely have a discretionary role in
determining whether to apply federal standards in state court proceedings.
Generally, "the state courts come out the same way on reverse-Erie that
federal courts do in the Erie setting."52 Therefore, "in adjudicating
federal-law claims, state courts apply federal law on clearly substantive
questions, and generally state courts apply state law on clearly procedural
questions." 3 In using state procedure to adjudicate federal claims, the
Supreme Court is unlikely to find a state court in error, absent the
existence of a state law that purposefully denies a federal right.54
The Conley model was considered liberal, and able to accommodate
most claims, at least to the extent that discovery was made available to a
plaintiff who could bear the simplicity of its "no set of facts" threshold.
Under the reverse-Erie concept, it follows that when Conley was still good
law, a state pleading system was required to accommodate federal claims
in a manner in which those claims would hypothetically be treated in
The Supreme Court rarely alludes to the topic of reverse-Erie. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S.
131, (1988); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown RR, 342 U.S. 359 (1952); see also Clermont,Reverse-Erie,
supra note 40, at 23.
'4
Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997).
s
Id. at 916. But see Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 738 (2009) (distinguishing Fankell on the
grounds that there the state rule did not discriminate against actions brought to vindicate civil rights). Reading
the two cases together, it follows that the Supreme Court will not disrupt a state's substantive or procedural
law as applied to federal claims unless the state law disrupts the "equality of treatment" required under
Supremacy clause analysis. See Hayutvd, 556 U.S. at 739.
s1
Fankell, 520 U.S. at 916.
52
Clermont, Reverse-e, supra note 40, at 29-30.
53
Id.
5
In Haywood, the state had purposefully denied plaintiffs the opportunity to litigate federal civil
rights claims in state court. See HayuAeed, 556 U.S. at 740. Only in circumstances as extzeme as in Hayumod is
it likely that a state court would be denied the opportunity to use state procedure when hearing federal
substantive claims. Consequently, in ordinary state court adjudications of federal claims, federal procedure
will not infiltrate state court systems. See Fankdli, 520 U.S. at 916.
5
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Under Conely, once a complaint survived a
motion to dismiss, a plaintiff was entitled to proceed to discovery, and only after an adequate opportunity in
discovery would an unmeritorious claim be weeded out through summaryjudgment. See FED. R CIV. P. 56.
In this manner, the Rules provided ample opportunity for a plaintiff to put forth a meritorious claim.
48
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federal court under the standards set forth in Conley." States did not
necessarily apply reverse-Erie methodology, but due to the widespread
use of Conley pleading adopted by the states," problems did not generally
arise between the federal and state criteria for the sufficiency of a
complaint when faced with a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court's
passive role in this area indicates as much. Indeed, the way that the
reverse-Erie doctrine "flows down to govern in state court . .. [it] does so
by uncertain means and to an uncertain extent."" Therefore, despite
federalism concerns, Conley jurisprudence flowed naturally to the states'
pleading rules, which allowed them to accommodate federal claims
without much need for federal pleading rules to force their way into state
courts.
The Twombly/Iqbal decisions destroyed the harmony that Conley
established throughout state jurisdictions with otherwise diverse
procedural standards. Assume a case similar to Brown v. Western Railway,
litigated today, and assume state procedure followed the Conely model.
The tables would be turned since the claim would potentially be defeated
in a federal court applying Iqbal's stricter plausibility standard where it
would be sufficient in jurisdiction that continued to follow Conely and
hence only required pure notice. Brown v.Western Railway dictated that
"states may not apply more stringent pleading standards than would be
applied to the case had it been brought in federal court.""
The
heightened pleading required by Iqbal in federal courts exemplifies the
reverse of the situation in Brown, because a state court following Conley is
now more likely to vindicate a federal right than a federal court under the
obligation to adhere to Iqbal's plausibility pleading requirement. Applying
a strict reverse-Erie analysis would require the state court to place a higher
burden on the plaintiff seeking relief under federal law, which is not the
purpose of the reverse-Erie doctrine as explained in Brown v. Western
Railway.
Despite the reverse-Erie doctrine and Brown v. Western Railway
propositions urging states to follow federal procedure when litigating
It is unlikely that state courts actively recognized the reverse-Erie concept See Clermont, ReveneErie, supra note 40, at 38-39 (acknowledging federal interests are not overbearing enough to push aside
conflicting state law). It seems more likely that Cnley was so ingrained in court jurisprudence, that for the
most part, when faced with a motion to dismiss, federal claims arrived at the same result in state court as they
would under the Federal Rules.
s7
Chen, supra note 33, at 1438-40.
8
Clermont, Revene-Erie,supra note 40, at 5.
5
Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great Split Between Federal and
State PleadingStandards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 121 (2010).
56
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federal claims, the U.S. Constitution does not require states to adopt the
plausibility model.' Moreover, in practice, state courts do not tend to
make reverse-Erie decisions; federal procedure generally does not invade
the state courts, unless by state court comity or state legislative action."
Just as the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a new pleading standard to be
applied in federal courts, state supreme courts can and should similarly
adopt pleading standards to be applied in their respective state courts,
notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court's activity in this area of
procedure.62
C. A Note on RemovalJurisdictionand Forum Shopping
The new disparity between the heightened pleading now required in
federal courts and the liberal Conley style of pleading that some states will
likely retain, plaintiffs may attempt to take advantage of the most lenient
standard by filing federal claims of concurrent jurisdiction in state court.'
Defendants' solution to this situation lies in removal jurisdiction.'
Removal is a contentious procedural device because it allows for a
defendant to thwart a plaintiff's ability to dictate the forum in which his
case will be heard and is easily "abuse [d]... as a forum-selection device.""
6
See Clermont &Yeazell, supra note 8, at 831 n.41 ("[Twiombly and Iqbal] have only persuasive force
outside the federal system.").
61
See Michalski, supra note 59, at 110-11 (acknowledging that state courts are not bound by

federal procedure).
6
See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997); see also Crum v.Johns Manville, Inc., 19 So. 3d
208, 212 n.2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) ("Our supreme court has adopted the standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson.
... Until such time as our supreme court decides to alter or abrogate this standard, we are bound to apply it,
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Tuonbly notwithstanding." (citations omitted)).
6
See Michalski,supra note 59, at 121. "Plaintiffs are thus likely to shift litigation to state courts when
not constrained by the exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Similarly, some plaintiffs
might reconfigure their complaints to avoid the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. Widening
procedural diversity, in short, will constrain more plaintiffs in more jurisdictions in how they can structure
complaints that will survive the pleading phase." Id It is important to note that some federal statutes deprive
plaintiffs of the opportunity to file in state court when pleading particular claims. Federal preemption of
certain claims has made federal court jurisdiction a prerequisite thereby usurping all of the plaintiffs power to
litigate in a state jurisdiction. For example, provisions of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998 (SLUSA) require class actions allegig securities fraud to be brought exclusively in federal courts and
provides for extensive removal provisions. See 15 U.S.C. S 78bb(f) (2006).
64
See 28 U.S.C. S 1441 (2006).
65
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNEu. L. REv. 119, 122
(2002). It can be argued however, that a plaintiff also has the opportunity to forum shop at the outset of the
litigation because claims involving concurrent

court.

jurisdiction can

typically be brought in either federal or state
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Heightened pleading in the federal courts amplifies the potential for
abuse, reaffirming the notion that "plaintiffs' win rate[s] in removed cases
is very low."' Now, defendants may easily capitalize on the burden that
plausibility pleading places on plaintiffs in order to successfully move for
dismissal in actions that would proceed to discovery in state court.
The primary pre-requisite for obtaining removal is that a defendant
must establish federal jurisdiction before being able to take advantage of a
federal forum. As far as federal questions' are concerned, a plaintiff has
the power to determine the defendant's eligibility to remove. Forum
shopping by defendants is curtailed by the "well-pleaded complaint" rule
which grants the plaintiff the ability to bar removal by choosing a cause of
action that does not arise under federal law.68 The well-pleaded complaint
rule creates a narrow window in pleadings by which a defendant can take
advantage of removal because it is the plaintiffs complaint, and not the
defendant's answer, which dictates whether removal is possible.69 If the
plaintiff does not plead a federal claim then there is no reverse-Erie
concern because federal law would not be disrupted by state procedure
since federal law would not be determined in the action. Moreover, if the
plaintiff does bring a federal claim, either the plaintiff can initiate the
action in federal court and comply with the plausibility standard, or the
defendant can remove to federal court, forcing the plaintiff to abide by the
higher threshold.
The purpose of the reverse-Erie doctrine was to prevent state
procedure from defeating viable federal claims. If states retain the Conley
standard, a federal claim can either proceed in state court or be removed
to be adjudicated under the Iqbal standard. Prior to Twombly/Iqbal, the
success achieved by defendants when removing cases was frequently
attributed

to

"plaintiff attorneys

who

.

.

. demonstrated

their

incompetence by already exposing their clients to removal" by filing
federal claims in state court,7 o and thus having their litigation plan
frustrated by removal. However, post-Iqbal, a plaintiffs strategy may take

6
Id. at 122-23 (stating that removal as a procedural device is itself is disruptive to a plaintiffs ability
to successfilly adjudicate a claim).
67
A federal question is a civil action "arising under" federal law. &e 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
6
See Louisville & Nashville RR v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (holding federal subject
matter jurisdiction proper only when plaintiff alleges a cause of action arising under the laws of the United
States).
69
See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (holding
that a counterclaim cannot serve as a basis for federal jurisdiction).
7o
Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 123.
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refuge in the leniency of state court by pleading claims without a federal
component.
This unique dance between the plaintiffs ability to choose whether to
plead a federal claim and the defendant's opportunity to remove protects
the viability of federal claims in the federalism model. However, plaintiffs
should exert caution when playing this forum-shopping game because
pleading with the goal of keeping the case in state court would require
foregoing causes of action under federal law. Although many state and
federal claims overlap, a plaintiff may be deprived of otherwise valid
federal claims if they are not brought due to a concern of removal by a
defendant. A plaintiff is typically required to bring all causes of action in a
single suit under the principles of claim preclusion.' Additionally, a
plaintiff cannot test the sufficiency of his complaint in federal court and
then upon dismissal, opt for a more lenient standard in state court,
because a dismissal under these circumstances typically operates as a
judgment on the merits thus barring a new complaint.
A defendant's ability to remove federal claims offers substantial
protection to federal substantive law from being thwarted by a state
procedural system. Furthermore, a plaintiff would be unwise to file a
federal claim in state court if the tainted procedure of the state jurisdiction
would stifle a plaintiffs ability to obtain relief. Since the federal pleading
standard is now a higher threshold than under many state rules of
procedure, state standards for determining the viability of a claim would
not thwart the viability of a federal claim." Rather it is the parties'
opportunistic use of forum-shopping that dictates whether the heightened
pleading standard of the federal courts will apply. Realistically, since "the
volume of business in state courts dwarfs that in federal courts," 74 everyday civil actions in state court will continue to decide federal claims

71
See, e.g., Frier v. City ofVandalia, 770 F.2d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he first suit operates as an
absolute bar to a subsequent action .. .not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain
or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that
purpose." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see abso RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS S 24
(1982).
72
See Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394,399 n.3 (1981) ("The dismissal for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is ajudgment on the merits." (internal quotations
omitted)).
7
The result is that the holding in Biown v. Westem Railway, 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949), is no longer
applicable due to Iqbal'sheightened pleading requirements.
7
Clermont,Revere-Erie,supra note 40, at 3.
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without interference from the Supreme Court and its interpretation of the
Federal Rules."
IV: HAVE THE STATES BEEN PERSUADED TO ADOPT IQBAL?

Whether any particular state will continue to follow Conley or adopt
and courts.
Iqbal is entirely up to the wisdom of the state's legislatures
76
either
likely
States that have traditionally followed the Federal Rules will
slowly begin to follow Iqbal's model or will be unresponsive, retaining the
Conley notice pleading standard. Conversely, states that never followed
Conley and instead followed a heightened pleading standard similar to that
mandated in Iqbal may now be more similar to the new federal model.
The jurisdictional discrepancies among the several states have always
spanned a unique spectrum, but post-Iqbal, the degree of requirements
facing a plaintiff at the pleadings stage will undoubtedly become even
more diverse than they were before Twombly.n
A. States where Iqbal has had little impact
Colorado provides an example of a state that has traditionally followed
the Federal Rules, but has not adopted the Iqbal interpretation of
plausibility into its state law equivalent of Federal Rule 8(a)(2).
Colorado's pleading rules track the exact language of the Federal "short
and plain statement" and the motion to dismiss." In light of the Federal
Rules, Colorado state courts adopted language similar to Conley, holding
that "a complaint is not to be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff cannot prove facts in support of the claim that would
entitle the plaintiff to relief."" After the Twombly decision, Colorado state
courts took notice that in order to survive the motion to dismiss under the
Federal Rules, "the complaint [must] set forth factual allegations
sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.""0 Still,

7s
76

See sources cited supra note 62.
See generally Oakley & Coon, supra note 34 (surveying the extent to which the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure have been adopted by the states).
7
See Michalski, supra note 59, at 111 (identifying the "splintering of pleading standards").
7
See COLO. R CIV. P. 8(a)(2) ("a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief."); CoLO. R Civ. P. 12(b)(5) ("failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted").
79
Coors Brewing Co. v. Floyd, 978 P.2d 663, 665 (Colo. 1999).
Western Innovations, Inc. v. SonitrolCorp., 187 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Colo. App. 2008) (internal
8
quotation marks omitted).
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Colorado state courts continued to apply Conley style pleading as matter of
Colorado procedural law."
More than a year after the Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal, the
Colorado Supreme Court justices forcefully declared that they "view with
disfavor a ... motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim."82 The court
did not mention Iqbal in its analysis, nor did it discuss the issue of
"plausibility."83 Not surprisingly, in a later decision determining a
contract dispute under Colorado law," the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado conducted an Iqbal analysis when determining the
sufficiency of a complaint vis-1-vis a motion to dismiss." Whereas the
Federal District Courts in Colorado must follow Iqbal, the Colorado state
courts do not, because the Colorado Supreme Court decided that its trial
courts should continue to follow the Conley language when ruling on
motions to dismiss. The federal-state dichotomy present in Colorado
highlights the Erie and reverse-Erie doctrines.86
The procedural rules of Pennsylvania provide a contrast to Colorado's
rules because Pennsylvania has never adopted the Federal Rules.
Pennsylvania state procedural rules differ from the Rules under Conley
due to a fact based pleading requirement." When "testing the legal
sufficiency of the challenged pleading," Pennsylvania courts "[admit] as
true all well-pleaded, material, relevant facts."" Consistent with Conley, a
Pennsylvania court must view the facts of the complaint in the light most
a1
See id. (citingCoors,978 P.2d at 665). However, in citing Twombly, the court noted that "[a] court
is not required to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations" and "a complaint may be
dismissed ifthe substantive law does not support the claims asserted." Id.
*
Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529, 533 (Colo. 2010) (en banc).
3
See id. ("Accepting all allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff the trial court properly grants a [motion to dismiss] only where the plaintiffs factual
allegations cannot, as a matter of law, support a claim for relief ").
8
Ciena Commc'ns, Inc. v. Nachazel, No. 09-CV-02845-MSK-MJW, 2010 WL 3489915, at *1 (D.
Colo. Aug. 31, 2010). It is important to note that the complaint stated causes of action under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1030 and the Stored Communication Act, 18 U.S.C. S 2701. Thus, federal
subject matter jurisdiction was proper. However, numerous other causes of action arose under a contract
dispute dictated by state substantive law. I mention that the federal court was using federal procedure to
determine the sufficiency of state law claim here merely to highlight the interchangeability of state substantive
law being litigated with the federal procedural rules. See discussion supra Part II.B.
s
Cena, 2010 WL 3489915, at *2.
8
The U.S. Supreme Court has called the differences between the state and federal systems
"fundamental to our system of federalism." Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997).
a
See 231 PA. R. C.P. No. 1019(a) ("The material facts on which a cause of action or defense
is based shall be stated in a concise and summary form.").
8
MacGregor v. Mediq Inc., 576 A.2d 1123, 1125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (citing Savitz v. Weinstein,
149 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1959)).
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favorable to the plaintiff. However, Pennsylvania courts diverge from the
Conley pleading standard by requiring that the complaint allege detailed
facts that go beyond pure notice. Conley's more lenient test required a
court to come up with any and all hypothetical facts that could entitle a
plaintiff to relief based on the cause of action alleged. 9 However,
Pennsylvania requires that a complaint "must do more than 'give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff s claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.'"'
A complaint must "formulate the issues by fully
summarizing the material facts ... i.e., those facts essential to support the
claim."9' Whereas Pennsylvania procedure views the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint is still required to plead
sufficient facts in which to establish a cause of action.
Interestingly, a type of the heightened pleading standard promulgated
in Iqbal was already well ingrained in Pennsylvania's jurisprudence. The
U.S. Supreme Court's clarification in Iqbal that legal conclusions are not
entitled to the presumption of truth' mimics Pennsylvania's procedural
requirement that a court must "admit as true all facts which are averred in
the complaint . .. but not the pleader's conclusions or averments of law."93
In order to withstand a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs in both jurisdictions
must allege a higher degree of facts than what is required under Conley
pleading standards. However, Pennsylvania jurisprudence does not
include the second prong of Iqbal's new test, that the plaintiff must
"nudge[] his claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible."94
Pennsylvania does not require that a plaintiff show "plausibility," but
rather that the complaint alleges sufficient facts."
Prior to Iqbal's
promulgation,
Pennsylvania's
pleading standard
had
already

8
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("[A] complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief.").
9
Gen. State Auth. v. Sutter Corp., 356 A.2d 377, 381 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976) (quoting Conley, 355
U.S. at 47).
91
Id.
9
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." (citing Bell Ad. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,555 (2007))).
93
Eden Roc Country Club v. Mullhauser, 204 A.2d 465, 466 (Pa. 1964).
9
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (brackets omitted).
9
See Sutter Corp., 356 A.2d at 381 (requiring a plaintiff to allege sufficient facts to allow the
defending party to prepare his case).
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independently adopted a version of the first prong of the Iqbal holding,
but not the second. 6
B. States that wholly adopt orfirmly reject Iqbal
Massachusetts state courts progressively follow U.S. Supreme Court
pleading doctrine jurisprudence. Shortly after the Twombly decision,
Massachusetts' highest court, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
refined the state's parameters for evaluating a complaint's sufficiency.97
Massachusetts wholly adopted Twombly's heightened pleading standard,
abandoning Conley's pleading standard by declaring "we follow the
[Supreme] Court's lead in retiring its use.""
In comparison to the federal circuit courts, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court was more proactive in swiftly declaring the state's
departure from Conley. Federal courts took more time to debate and
consider whether or not to limit Twombly's standards to the antitrust
context. One year prior to Iqbal, Massachusetts was already leading the
charge by mandating the threshold requirement that a complaint contain
"factual allegations plausibly suggesting an entitlement to relief."99
After the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued its version of
the heightened pleading standards, lower Massachusetts state courts deftly
In
applied the new standards when ruling on a motion to dismiss.'"t
attempting to follow the federal standard, the trial judges of Massachusetts
are invariably in the same position as all of the U.S. district court judges in
attempting to decipher the correct method of Iqbal's application.
In stark contrast to the Massachusetts approach, the Washington
Supreme Court became "the first state supreme court post-Iqbal to
abandon the ideal of national procedural uniformity over the contentious
issue of plausibility pleading."o. In McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank,102 the

%
The first prong is that legal conclusions are not entitled to be treated as true. The second prong
requires that a complaint must state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face in order to withstand a motion
to dismiss for failure to satisfy the short and plain statement requirement. To meet the plausibility
requirement, the complaint must allege facts that would allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-81.
9
See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 NE2d 879,890 (Mass. 2008).
98
Id.
9
Id.
10
See, e.g., Plante v. Town of Blackstone, 27 Mass. L. Rptr. 147, 150 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2010)
("A threadbare recital of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
does not suffice.").
101
Michalski, supra note 59, at 109.
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court denounced the applicability of the Iqbal standard in Washington
state courts because the "plausibility standard is predicated on policy
3 The court held that
determinations specific to the federal trial courts.""o
those "policy determinations [do not] hold sufficiently true in the
Washington trial courts to warrant such a drastic change in court
The court rationalized its decision because of the
procedure."'"
detrimental effect that Iqbal's plausibility pleading standard will have on
plaintiffs' ability to gain access to information via discovery,105 a
proposition that has been a subject of much discussion among legal
scholars since the promulgation of the plausibility standard. 106
Prior to McCurry, the state of Washington, like Colorado, followed the
Federal Rules with regard to their state's standards for determining the
sufficiency of a complaint. Now, however, Colorado and Washington
apply different pleading standards than the federal system. Colorado
continues to follow Conely's interpretation of the Rules, and Washington
courts have completely rejected any state court application of the Iqbal
standard. Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's departure from Conley,
Washington accepted the federal interpretations of the Rules, and
considered those interpretations to be highly persuasive."o' But after Iqbal,
the McCurry court clearly indicated that it would no longer follow the
U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Rules, at least to the
extent of the relationship between Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6). The
Washington court was of the opinion that the Iqbal decision was based on
policy and not grounded in legal precedent."o' The McCurry decision
strongly suggests that Washington courts will likely be skeptical of future
federal interpretations of procedural rules.

McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861 (Wash. 2010) (en banc).
Id. at 863.
104
Id.
105
See id. at 863-64 (describing plaintiffs inability to access information exclusively in possession of
defendants).
106
See CIVIN &ADEGBILE, supra note 24, at 5 ("In many civil nghts cases, most, if not all, pertinent
information is within the exclusive province of the defendant.").
107
See Michalski, supra note 59, at 110 n.3.
108
The Washington Supreme Court posed questions that went unaddressed in the Iqbal decision,
notably "do current discovery expenses justify plaintiffs' loss of access to that discovery and general access to
the courts, particularly in cases where evidence is almost exclusively in the possession of defendants?"
McCurry, 233 P.3d at 863. The McCurry decision disdainfilly highlighted the negative impact of a Supreme
Court case as based purely on policy and not in precedent in the law. See id.
102
103
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C. Hybrid States
The Nebraska Supreme Court, while not as skeptical as Washington
or as accepting as Massachusetts, has acknowledged the usefulness of
plausibility pleading. In determining whether dismissal was proper, the
Nebraska high court noted its belief that "the Court's decision in Twombly
provides a balanced approach for determining whether a complaint should
survive a motion to dismiss and proceed to discovery."10 9 Despite the
court's praise of Twombly's balanced approach, it recognized a major flaw
different judges may have vastly divergent
in the Iqbal method:
understandings and conclusions when viewing identical allegations set
forth in a plaintiffs complaint. "For example, even the Iqbal majority
treated what were basically the same allegations both as implausible factual
The Nebraska
allegations and as a mere recitation of the elements."'
Court's identification and preoccupation with this inherent flaw in Iqbal's
plausibility pleading standard is one of the principal concerns of
determining plausibility.
Despite expressing its concerns that trial judges may inconsistently
apply the "plausibility" standard set forth in Iqbal, the Nebraska Supreme
Court nonetheless adopted the Twombly analysis without speculating on
the application of the U.S. Supreme Court's attempt at further guidance
in the Iqbal decision. The Nebraska court noted, however, that "[i]n cases
in which a plaintiff does not or cannot allege specific facts showing a
necessary element, the factual allegations, taken as true, are nonetheless
plausible if they suggest the existence of the element and raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the element
or claim.""' This language suggests that although the plausibility standard
is present in Nebraska, it is not as strict as Iqbal's test, insofar as a court
must be willing to grant further discovery in order to allow a plaintiffs
claim to rise to the level of plausibility.112
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals had a different view of
Twombly than the Nebraska Court. The D.C. court initially ignored
Twombly's holding and cited Twombly for the purpose of reiterating the

109

1o

Doe v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 788 N.W.2d 264,278 (Neb. 2010).
Id. ("We recognize that the Court's decision in Iqbd. reflects a tension in how different judges

might view the same allegations.").
nl
Cent. Neb. Pub. Power and Irrigation Dist. v. N. Platte Natural Res. Dist., 788 N.W.2d 252,258
(Neb. 2010).
112
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009) (holding plaintiff not entitled to any discovery to
assist in the plausibility showing).
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holding of Conley."' Instead of immediately following the U.S. Supreme
Court's lead into plausibility pleading, the D.C. court relied on precedent
within its own jurisdiction before changing its pleading standards in light
of Iqbal. "[I]t may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is
very remote and unlikely but that is not the test" for judging the
sufficiency of a complaint in D.C. trial courts.114 Rather, all facts are taken
as true and "all that is required . . . is a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.""s More recently, the
D.C. high court declared that "a complaint should not be dismissed
because a court does not believe that a plaintiff will prevail on his
claim.""' Additionally, the court specifically reserved the question of
whether it will follow the plausibility standard promulgated in Iqbal in the
future."' However, in a later decision, the D.C. court recognized that it
was required by statute to "conduct its business according to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.""' Therefore, the court determined that it was
required to adopt U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 8(a) as
decided in Iqbal notwithstanding the court's earlier reservations
concerning plausibility pleading.
A recent statement by a West Virginia Supreme Court Justice is
indicative of the situation states face in the post-Iqbal era: "I suspect it will
be only a matter of time before this Court is confronted with the issue of
whether West Virginia should adopt an interpretation of our Rules of Civil
Procedure akin to that of the United States Supreme Court.""19 When it
comes time to rule on the applicability of Iqbal in a particular jurisdiction,
the states should be cognizant of the considerations to take into account
before deciding on the adoption of Iqbal and plausibility pleading.

113
See Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 948 (D.C. 2009) (citing Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (The purpose of this statement is to
"give the defendant fair notice of what the pleader's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." (brackets
omitted)).
114
Soles, 977 A.2d at 947.
115
Id. at 948.
116
Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219,229 (D.C. 2011) (brackets omitted).
117
See id. at 229 n.16 ("[T]his court has not yet decided whether it will follow the facial plausibility
standard enunciated inAshooti v. Iqbal." (internal citations omitted)).
"
Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 543-44 (D.C. 2011) (citing D.C. Code
§ 11-946).
119
Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., 700 S.E.2d 183, 196 (W.Va. 2010) (Benjamin, J., dissenting); see also
Robinson v. Pack, 679 S.E.2d 660, 669 (W. Va. 2009) (adopting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) on
other grounds and holding no supervisory liability in connection with civil rights violation).
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V: CONSIDERATIONS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FOR STATES
PONDERING A CHANGE IN PLEADING

The states must make their own policy determinations when
implementing changes to their procedural systems. In doing so, the states
should be mindful of both the problems that plausibility pleading imposes
on the judicial system and the unsound method by which the U.S.
Supreme Court created this new approach. In promulgating plausibility
pleading, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that conclusory allegations
based on an inadequate set of facts will no longer entitle a plaintiff to the
benefit of the judicial process.' 20 Plausibility pleading is a tool that can be
liberally employed by district judges in their efforts to efficiently manage
their dockets because they can prevent meritless claims from entangling
the federal courts. Additionally, plausibility pleading prevents defendants
from being dragged into litigation where there is minimal factual support
for the claims alleged. Although Iqbal has strong benefits for judges and
defendants, the disadvantages it presents to plaintiffs are substantial.12'
The states should assess both the drawbacks and benefits inherent in a
new pleading doctrine.
Whatever policy issues concerned the Supreme Court Justices, the
appellate judges and legislators of the states undoubtedly have different
ideas.'" Although states such as Massachusetts and Washington have
made their position on plausibility pleading clear, many other states have
yet to take a position on whether to adopt Iqbal into their own rules of
procedure.'" Because states often assume the wisdom of Supreme Court

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
See Eaton, supra note 27, at 301 ("Iqbal has unquestionably erected substantial barriers to
the judicial system for certain plaintiffs that were nonexistent under the notice pleading regime."); see
also Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal's Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U.
Rich. L. Rev. 603 (January 2012) (using a statistical approach to confirm that Iqbal's effect on pleading
is undeniable).
122
See McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 863 (Wash. 2010) (finding that the federal
policy determinations that gave rise to the plausibility standard are specific to federal trial courts and do not
hold true in Washington state courts).
123
While each state is free to choose its own course in crafting a system of civil procedure,
Massachusetts, in particular, adopted Iqbal blindly without examining the negative consequences. See
Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 (Mass. 2008) ("[W]e take the opportunity to adopt the
refinement of that standard that was recently articulated by the United States Supreme Court"). If a state
believes that a change in pleading doctrine is in fact necessary at all, then they should carefully examine the
consequences ofany particular course of action instead of blindly adopting any doctrinal changes promulgated
by federal courts.
120
121
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jurisprudence and are thus more willing to hastily adopt its rulings,'124 it is
imperative that state courts and legislatures are made aware of the
potential consequences of following the Supreme Court's lead in this
particular instance. Because the Iqbal decision has the "the potential to
usher in a new era of procedural diversity,"125 the states should adopt
procedural systems that reflect that state's particular policy needs, without
blindly relying on the Supreme Court's guidance.
The Iqbal decision has two major deficiencies: the application of
plausibility pleading and the method by which the Supreme Court created
it.126
The application of plausibility pleading is flawed because the
manner in which facts are scrutinized by trial judges allows for too much
of the judge's personal discretion. This problem is compounded by the
lack of facts available to the judge at the commencement of litigation as
well as the Supreme Court's failure to provide clear guidance for trial
judges when they issue rulings on the existence of plausibility.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's method of creating plausibility
pleading standard through its holdings in Twombly and Iqbal was flawed
because those cases were decided without legal precedent or prior debate
on the merits of plausibility pleading. When formulating a procedural
system to fit their own unique policy concerns the states should proceed
with caution in order to avoid these serious problems in the Iqbal decision.
A. Judging Facts: The New Role of the TrialJudge
Plausibility pleading presents the trial judge with an entirely new factinterpreting role at the beginning of litigation. Under the Iqbal test,
adequate facts must be stated in the complaint, and this adequacy
determination is the duty of the judge alone. 27 in order to satisfy this test,
the judge must engage in factual interpretation, a role that under Conley
was otherwise reserved for later in litigation and was less often the role of
the judge at all. In the federal courts, the right to jury trial in most civil
actions is a constitutional right.128 As the fact-finder, the jury makes
credibility determinations on the facts presented to it and is the ultimate
See sources cited supra note 37.
Michalski, supra note 59, at 111.
For a discussion of other leading scholarly interpretations of Iqbal's deficiencies seegenerally Eaton,
supra note 27, at 315-16.
127
See, e.g., Wright Er AL, supra note 6.
128
U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also FED. R Civ. P. 38. It is worth noting that certain categories of
124
12
126

civil actions are not triable byjury. See, e.g. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996)
(holding patent disputes require sophisticated analysis to be determined byjudge, notjury).
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decider on what actually transpired in a given case. Under Iqbal, however,
the judge determines whether the facts alleged state a plausible cause of
action at the pleadings stage. In making this assessment of facts, judges
are now able to usurp the fact-finding power of a jury and dismiss claims
in which reasonable minded jurors may have disagreed.'2 9
Constitutional concerns aside, judges generally have a discordant
ability to ascertain factual reasonableness. The criteria set forth in Iqbal
requires that a district judge make a "reasonable inference" to determine
whether the facts alleged give rise to a plausible claim.'3 0 When a judge
engages in this type of fact-interpreting endeavor, litigants should be
skeptical. As a comparison, other portions of the Federal Rules recognize
situations where the district judge must make determinations regarding
the sufficiency of the facts presented to him. For example, in ruling on a
motion for a judgment as a matter of law,"' the judge may not "weigh the
evidence,"'32 but may only grant the motion if "no jury could decide in
that party's favor.""' Furthermore, if "reasonable minds could differ" as
to the conclusion to be adduced from the facts, it is improper for the
judge to make the determination himself."' In this context, the factfinding process is protected because a judge must defer to what a
hypothetical person could ascertain, rather than his own opinions
standing alone.
In contrast, in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Iqbal, the judge
must make "reasonable inferences" without determining whether
reasonable minds could differ, but merely by what is reasonable to that
individual judge."' As articulated by the Supreme Court, the judge's role
See Clermont&Yeazellsupra note 8, at 837 ("[Olne should worry that the Court was improperly
intruding on the factfinder's domain."); see also Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and
Democracy: Restoring a Realitic Prospectof Trial, 46 Harv. C.R-C.L L Rev. 399,403 (Summer 2011) ("[Twombly
and Iqbal] are an implicit attack on the jury trial and, in turn, on our democracy."). Burbank and Surbin also
point out, "[t]here would not have been an acceptable Bill of Rights without a right to trial byjury" Id.at 402.
1o
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) ("A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.").
131
See FED. R. CIv. P. 50(a).
132
See Hurd v. Am. Hoist and Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495,498 (10th Cir. 1984). "The question is not
whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is directed but whether
there is evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for the party." Id at 499 (quoting C.
129

WRIGHT &A MILILER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

S 2524, at

543 (1971)).

Indian Coffee Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 752 F.2d 891, 894 (3d Cir. 1985).
13
See Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244,1252 (9th Cir. 1985); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: GEN. PRINCIPLES S 5(a) (D.D., 1999).
1s
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663.
133
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is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense."' 3 6 Whereas a motion for a
judgment as a matter of law protects the non-moving party from a judge's
own opinions and biases by forcing him to make his determination based
upon whether "no jury could decide,"' in a motion to dismiss, the judge
is free to determine what is plausible from his own common sense. 38
This ruling should not be taken lightly given that it is the standard that
dictates whether cases are even considered eligible for litigation.
The 2007 Supreme Court decision in Scott v. Harrism provides a
beneficial illustration of when a judge's common sense determination of
facts can differ from that of other reasonable people. In Scott v. Harris,
the Court was charged with determining what a reasonable juror would
conclude in assessing following situation: "a police officer deliberately
rammed his car into that of a fleeing motorist who refused to pull over for
4
speeding and instead sought to evade the police in a high-speed chase." '
In order to accomplish this task, the Justices watched a video tape of the
events, instead of relying on the facts found by the jury at trial, and
refused to take the defendant's version of the facts into account. 142 Not
surprisingly, the Court had "little difficulty in concluding it was
reasonable" for the police officer to act way the way in which he did.143
When the video tape was shown "to a diverse sample of 1350
Americans . . . there were sharp differences of opinion along cultural,

ideological, and other lines.""

136
137

The Court's "insistence that there was

Id. at 679 (quoting lqbal v. Hasty, 490 F3d 143, 157-58 (2nd Cir. 2007)).
See Indian Coffee Corp., 752 F.2d at 894.

13

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664.
See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 8, at 833 n.47 ("[T]he Court's articulation and application of
the new test in Twombly and Iqbal may appear to require a stronger claim than does summaryjudgment, but
that relationship would be nonsensical. It would instead make policy sense to require a weaker claim at the
pleading stage."). Considering that the motion forjudgment as a matter of law is made after the presentation
of all the evidence, and the motion to dismiss is made by judging only the parties' initial allegations, providing
the non-moving party more protection after he has had ample opportunity to present his case and less
protection at the preliminary stage in litigation is troubling in the least. Furthermore, by examinng the
requirements placed on ajudge in ruling on a motion pursuant to Rule 50(a) is example of how the new Iqbal
standard forjudging the relationship between Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) runs afoul with the rest of the Federal
Rules.
140
Scottv. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
141
Daniel M. Kahan, et. al.,, Whose Eyes are you Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perilsof
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REv. 837, 838 (2009).
139

142

See id. at 839.

143

See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. at 38 4.
Kahan, et. al., supra note 141, at 838.

144
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only one 'reasonable' view of the facts itself reflected a form of bias" and
seriously calls into question a judge's ability to make an objective
assessment of facts. 145
Scott v. Harris illustrates my argument that viewing facts objectively
and making a determination on "reasonableness" is an ambiguous process.
Fact specific causes of action, such as negligence, require a judge to make
determinations on facts that can only be deduced through the judge's own
personal history.146 Because discovery is unavailable at the pleadings stage,
the judge's own prejudices and beliefs will fill the gaps in between the
facts. "In cases like Iqbal, where the defendant has critical private
information, the plaintiff will not get past the pleading stage if she cannot
ferret out enough facts before filing to get over the merits threshold for
each element of her claim."147 The limited factual nature of a complaint
will cause a judge to speculate and hypothesize creating an atmosphere
where litigants will be at the mercy of a judge's own personal history.148
Therefore, it becomes critical for a plaintiff to provide the judge with
enough facts at the pleading stage to reduce the likelihood of a judge
dipping into his own breadth of experience, as the Justices did in Scott v.
Harris.
B. Difficulty ofPleadingAdequate Facts Without the Benefit ofDiscovery
Depending on the type of pleading standard, whether it be pure
notice, fact specific, or something analogous to plausibility, the roles of
the plaintiff, defendant, and judge differ based on their burdens and
activity required. In plausibility pleading, the three roles are as follows:
there exists a heavy burden on the plaintiff to produce facts; the judge
must make difficult determinations based on the minimal facts a plaintiff
is able to produce; and the defendant can largely sit back and rely on a

145

Id.

Cf Burbank & Surbin, supra, note 129, at 401-02 ("Issues such as negligence, intentional
discrimination, material breach of contract, and unfair competition are not facts capable of scientific
demonstration. Nor are these issues pure questions of law. Rather, they are concepts mixing elements offact
and law that become legitimate behavioral norms when the citizenry at large, acting through jury
representatives, decides what the community deems acceptable.").
147
Bone, supra note 4, at 878-79 ("[S]trict pleading will screen some meritorious suits, even ones with
a high probability of trial success but a probability that is not evident at the pleading stage before access to
discovery.")
148
In Scott v. Harris,Justice Scalia compared what he saw in the video tape to a scene from the film
"The French Connection." See Kahan et. al., supra note 141, at 839.
146
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well drafted motion to dismiss, with a promising chance of never having
to delve further into pleadings by producing an answer.'49
A plaintiff's complaint must provide enough facts to convince a judge
of the plausibility of a defendant's wrongdoing and a plaintiffs failure to
plead adequate facts poses a substantial risk for an adverse ruling,
specifically dismissal. Aside from the disparate litigation resources that are
often present between a plaintiff and defendant,"so the defending party
usually controls access to pertinent information needed by the plaintiff in
order to provide factual support for its claim."' This proposition presents
a unique conundrum in light of the Iqbal decision:
In order to enter the discovery phase of the litigation process,
where litigants may use the power of the court to gain access to
evidence in an opponent's possession, plaintiffs must now state
their claims in more factual detail than before. Often, however,
plaintiffs cannot allege detailed facts until they gain access to
detailed evidence through the discovery process.'52
Under Iqbal, a plaintiff is now required to engage in pre-complaint fact
investigation in order to carry his burden, but without the help of a
court's subpoena power or the numerous discovery devices provided in
the Federal Rules.153
The Iqbal Court, while perhaps not unmindful of the plaintiff's
conundrum, was unyielding in providing a plaintiff with a discovery
mechanism. The majority in Iqbal determined that when a "complaint is
deficient under Rule 8, [the plaintiff] is not entitled to discovery, cabined
or otherwise."'54 This has dire implications for a plaintiff who has no

149
See Eaton, supra note 27, at 313 ("Following the Supreme Court's decision, Iqbal motions to
dismiss became commonplace in federal courts with remarkable speed and success.").
15 Defendants are often institutional actors such as corporations or government units that have inhouse counsel or attorneys on retainer and are accustomed to litigation. Whereas a plaintiff likely has never
been involved in a lawsuit and does not have the financial resources set aside to pursue one. I am mindfiul,
however, of the ability of class actions and pro bono work to balance this disparity.
1s1
See CiviN &ADEGBILE, supra note 24, at 5.
152
Lisa Eichhorn, A Sense ofDisentilement: Frame-Shingand Metaphor in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 62 Fla. L
Rev. 951, 952 (2010).
153
See, e.g, FED. R Civ. P. 30(a)(1) ("The deponent's attendance may be compelled by subpoena.").
154
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009). But see Jonathan D. Frankel, May We Plead the Court?
Twombly, Iqbal and the "New" Practice of Pleading, 38 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1191, 1217 (2010) (arguing for brief
targeted discovery before a complaint is filed).
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means to compel a defendant to cough up the information necessary to
comply with Iqbal's factual adequacy requirement.
District judges are faced with a similar lack-of-facts dilemma at the
pleadings stage since a judge must determine plausibility of a claim based
on facts that are largely incomplete and unavailable. Whereas judges are
allowed to inquire into the nature of facts when making a procedural
determination on certifying a class action,' there is no such device for a
judge making a determination on a motion to dismiss. Aside from
argument by counsel at a hearing on the motion to dismiss or any pre-trial
conferences, if available, the judge must take the plaintiffs complaint as it
is stated without any additional information as to the facts stated within.
In figuring out how to proceed under Iqbal's murky guidelines, district
judges may be tempted to use a limited form of discovery to ascertain the
factual basis upon which a complaint is founded. Although, the Iqbal
decision was adamant about preventing the disclosure of information to
plaintiffs for the purpose of satisfying the plausibility requirement, 156
district judges may seek opportunities to discover information necessary
to fill in the holes of a plaintiff s complaint. In doing so however, judges
may risk crossing the line of impartiality thus threatening the adversarial
process. For that reason, "[j]udges may conclude that the increased risk
of dismissal of . .. claims is unfortunate, but that this outcome is simply
an unintended consequence of the application of neutral procedural
rules."'"
When a plaintiffs claim is based on facts that are difficult for a judge
to objectively verify, judges will have further difficulty during factual
interpretation. Consider the example of claims such as the ones alleged
by the plaintiff in Iqbal, where discriminatory intent is alleged.
This type of information is often within the exclusive knowledge
of the defendant and the plaintiff will usually have considerable
difficulty learning much about it before filing. As a result, general
See Suzette M. Malveaux, FrontLoading and Heavy Ifing How Pre-dismissalDiscoey CanAddress
the DetrinentalEfect of Iqbalon Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWis &CILARK L. REV. 65,66 (2010) ("Courts already use
early, targeted, pre-merits discovery to resolve threshold issues such as class certification, qualified immunity
and jurisdiction.").
156
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686.
157
In order to prevent oneself from going beyond what the parties have presented to the court,
district judges may simply rely on their own common sense without attempting to read further into the
alleged facts. See id. at 679 (making determination based on judicial "common sense"); cf Kahan et. al., supra
note 141, at 839 (arguing that the justices simply call it as they see it).
158
Malveaux, supra note 155, at 106.
155
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allegations merely reciting the existence of a state of mind or a
private action are not likely to instill much confidence that the
plaintiff will be able to prove those allegations at trial.s 9
Just as in Iqbal, other plaintiffs pleading claims involving the intent of a
defendant, will have little factual matter to state in the complaint since the
facts that are needed to provide a plausible claim are wholly within the
province of the defendant.
The Supreme Court appears to understand the difficulty of alleging
the subjective intent of a defendant. For example, in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,' the Court eliminated the subjective "good faith" defense in
qualified immunity claims due to the difficult nature of determining the
state of mind of a defendant as it related to his conduct. 6 ' The Court
opined that "variables explain in part why questions of subjective intent so
rarely can be decided by summary judgment.' 62 The Supreme Court
held that it is proper to examine the objective reasonableness of a
defendant's conduct when determining qualified immunity."
Conversely, under Iqbal, claims of subjective intent are now ruled on at
the pleadings stage of litigation," much earlier than the summary
judgment stage, which typically occurs after some discovery has taken
place.
By changing the pleading standard, but not the process for gaining
discovery, the Supreme Court created a large discrepancy in favor of the
party defending a lawsuit. The deficiency this creates in the procedure
itself will likely manifest in district judges finding unique ways in which
to attempt to fashion an avenue for a plaintiff to gain relief, or at least the
ability to obtain discovery in order to fairly attempt to gain relief." Local
rules aside,' district judges will not be able to fashion procedural
159

16o
161
162

Bone, supra note 4, at 873.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
See id. at 818.
Id. at 816.

163
Id. at 818 ("[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights ofwhich a reasonable person would have known.").
'6
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) ("[T]he plaintiff must plead and prove that the
defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.").
165
See Butt v. United Broth. of Carpenters &Joiners of America, No. 09-4285, slip op. at 1,2010 WL
2080034, at 1 (E.D. Pa. Ivlay 19, 2010) (refusing to follow Jqbal because the court interpreted it as dicta);
Waterfront Renaissance Assocs. v. City of Phila., 701 F.Supp.2d 633, 639 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (continuing to rely
on Conleyv. Gibson).
166
See generally Carl Tobias, Civiljusice Refnn and die
Balkanization ofFederal CiviT Procedure, 24 AIz.
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remedies with any sort of regularity or equality. Whereas some may
indeed attempt to provide plaintiffs with a low threshold of what
constitutes "plausible" others, especially with frustratingly large dockets
may side with defendants. A scrupulous defendant will be mindful of a
particular judge's rationale for determining "plausibility." Therefore, a
well drafted motion to dismiss will be successful in achieving the primary
goal of every defendant, the termination of litigation without providing
access to discovery.
Since "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,""' the best
attack a defendant can make in its motion to dismiss is arranging a
plaintiffs well-pleaded facts, as mere legal conclusions. Creating doubt in
the district judge's mind as to the difference between a factual allegation
and a legal conclusion will pay dividends in drafting the motion to
dismiss. Justice Souter's dissent in Iqbal provides insight into the
problems that district judges will have in interpreting a complaint. "[T]he
majority's holding that the statements it selects are conclusory cannot be
squared with its treatment of certain other allegations in the complaint as
The majority in Iqbal itself could not distinguish
nonconclusory."1"
between conclusory and nonconclusory allegations, which makes it
unlikely that any district judge would fare much better.'69 "[There is] a
serious difficulty with the degree-of-generality approach to distinguishing
conclusions from facts. There is no obvious way to draw a line along the
generality-specificity continuum, and the Iqbal majority offers nothing to
guide the analysis in a sensible way.""'
Due to the Iqbal decision's deficiencies, districtjudges, when ruling on
a motions to dismiss, (1) must not give legal conclusions the presumption
of truth, yet Iqbal provides no guidance for judges to distinguish between
conclusory and nonconclusory allegations; and (2) must determine
whether factual allegations are plausible based on a scarce set of facts by

ST. L.J. 1393, 1396-99 (1992) (describing the use of local rules in response to the increase in federal court
litigation).
167
See lqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
168
Id. at 699 (Souter, J., dissenting); see aim Bone, supra note 4, at 858 ("It is highly significant that
Justices Souter and Breyer dissented in Iqbal. Both were with the majority in Twombly. Moreover, Justice
Souter, who wrote the principal dissenting opinion in Iqbal, actually authored the majority opinion in
Twombly. These are strong signs that Iqbal is notjust a straightforward application ofTwombly.").
169
See Doe v. Bd. of Regents of University of Nebraska, 788 N.W.2d 264, 278 (Neb. 2010)
(discussing the concern that differentjudges view the same allegations differently).
170
Bone, supra note 4, at 861.
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These problems are not
using their own personal experience.' 7 '
surprising considering a tribunal of 9 justices, particularly in a 5-4
decision, changed fifty years of jurisprudence concerning whether
lawsuits can even be heard in federal court. Every federal civil action is
bound by the new interpretation of the Federal Rules. It is because of
these far reaching effects that the rule-making process has been the
traditional model utilized to make changes in the rules of procedure.'
C. The Rulemaking Process Should Be Used
The leniency of the pre-Twombly gatekeeping rules was a
"fundamental choice in procedural design.""' It was neither the best nor
the only equation for the proper form of procedure in American trial
courts. In that same vein, the Iqbal standard is also a choice of procedural
design and is by no means the best pleading standard for civil actions.
The rules-makers themselves, even after being prompted by the "bench
and bar," did not disturb notice pleading as it existed under Conley.'74
Rather it was the Supreme Court in a decision fraught with homeland
security concerns that prompted the departure. 7 ' The panic that ensued
shortly after 9/11 is hardly the context in which to formulate an entirely
new procedural regime particularly "without [any] precedent in the
law.""' Interestingly, the pre-9/11 Supreme Court was serious about
preserving an individual's access to the federal courts when pleading a
cause of action involving the deprivation of rights by a government

See Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 663-64,683 (promulgating and applying this two-pronged test).
See sources cited infra notes 181-82.
"
Clermont &Yeazell, supra note 8, at 825.
"
See id. at 826 n.12.
175
Clermont and Yeazell provide an interesting discussion regarding the Court's
understanding of the context in which Iqbal's discrimination occurred. "Defending these cases would
very likely have involved many hours of depositions of high public officials with possibly discouraging
effects on future public servants. It might also require the United States to lay bare substantial
amounts of information about the early, and perhaps panicked, behavior in the months immediately
following September 11." See id. at 829. Moreover, "high-ranking officials charged with national law
enforcement ... surely had incentives temporarily to disregard constitutional constraints." Id. at 843.
The Second Circuit, in finding for Iqbal, had determined that "the exigent circumstances of the post9/11 context do not diminish the Plaintiffs right not to be needlessly harassed and mistreated in the
confines of a prison cell by repeated strip and body-cavity searches." Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143,
159-60 (2d Cir. 2007).
7
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 8, at 831 ("No prior model exist[ed] to help us understand
how to test factual sufficiency now.").
171
172
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actor.' 7 The fact that the Iqbal Court's ad hoc approach to dealing with a
Pakistani Muslim and his claim of discrimination in the wake of 9/11,
formulated a change in pleading for all civil actions, certainly
demonstrates the need for a deliberative body to examine the legitimacy of
far reaching procedural changes before they go into effect.
The U.S. Supreme Court completely bypassed the step of thorough
premeditated debate and declared the new plausibility standard without
considering any empirical data. Furthermore, there was not any lower
court jurisprudence on which the court could build. In deciding Iqbal, the
Court formulated an entirely new gatekeeping role to be used by district
judges across the country, without any basis to do so. "That this shift to
more fact-specific pleadings happened without advanced warning to
litigants in a legal system which for some seventy years has been noticebased

. . .

is something worthy of note.""'

It is imperative that states

question the sudden and radical departure taken in Iqbal and perhaps more
importantly, scrutinize the decision for the lack of precedent contained
therein and the disregard for the consequences that have followed.
States are free to make their own fundamental choices when crafting
their procedural systems, consistent with the spirit of federalism, balanced
between the concerns ofjudicial economy and providing parties adequate
means of securing relief. If a state finds that it is indeed in the best policy
interests of that state to adopt a change in procedure, then the rulesmaking process should be the method in which to adopt a new regime
because it provides a manageable and gradual change in procedural
reform. Some state supreme courts have already articulated their
understandings of this approach with statements such as "[t]he
appropriate forum for revising the Washington rules is the rule-making
process,"'79 and "I believe it preferable that we consider it in the reflection
of rule-making rather than in the vacuum of an individual case before us
on appeal."' 8 0 This alternative to the U.S. Supreme Court's approach may
ensure that hasty judicial decisions alone do not supplant prior well-

177
See Leatherman v. Tan-ant County Narcotics, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (holding a heightened
pleading standard may not be imposed on S1983 cases).
178
Roth v. DeFehceCare, Inc., 700 S.E.2d 183, 196 (W.Va. 2010) (Benjamin, J., dissenting) ("The
same policy considerations facing federal cases are also applicable in the state court system.")
179
McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 864 (Wash. 2010) (citing Bell Ad. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 595 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). The rule making "process permits policy
considerations to be raised, studied, and argued in the legal community and the community at large." See
McCurry, 233 P3d at 864.
1o
Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., 700 S.E.2d 183, 197 (W.Va. 2010) (Benjamin,J., dissenting).
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reasoned portions of the procedural system."' Any change to pleading
doctrine should also incorporate other sections of the rules of procedure
Whereas when
so that they may continue to operate as a cohesive unit.
at bar, the
case
of
a
particular
outcome
the
a court is tasked with deciding
use of a deliberative rules-making body allows multiple minds to consider
the prudence of one rule change and its place within the rules as a whole.
Prior to Iqbal, the Supreme Court seemed to understand the
importance a rule-making process free from judicial intervention.
However, in promulgating the plausibility standard the Court abandoned
a long line of jurisprudence steadfastly giving deference to the rulemaking process.'" By building up of the importance of rule-making
through a line of Supreme Court cases, only to completely reverse course
upon deciding Iqbal gives great weight to Clermont and Yeazell's
classification of the Iqbal decision as a "destabilization."'
Conversely, the
See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 8, at 847 ("The Court had given no forewarning adequate to
generate public discussion. The complicated issues were not sufficiently developed by lower-court
percolation, by academic or empirical studies, or even by parties' position-taking.").
182
See Watson Clay, May the Federal Civil Rules Be Successfully Adopted to Improve State Procedure?,
24 F.R.D. 437, 439 (1960) ("[T]he federal rules ... embody an interlocking scheme of procedure, and
any change in one rule may adversely affect the application or interpretation of other rules."). As we
have seen with Iqbal the change in pleading without any change of discovery has placed a heavy
burden on plaintiffs and conflicts with other Federal Rules. See supra pp. 29-30. There were
alternatives available to the Supreme Court rather than the reworking of the entire system of pleading.
For example, "a trial court, responsible for managing a case . . . can structure discovery in ways that
diminish the risk of imposing unwarranted burdens upon public officials." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 700 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2007)).
183
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 224 (2007) ("[A]dopting different and more onerous
pleading rules to deal with particular categories of cases should be done through established
rulemaking procedures, and not on a case-by-case basis by the courts."); see also Arthur R. Miller, From
Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DuKE L.J. 1 (2010)
(pointing to the fact that Jones v. Bock was decided just 5 months prior to Twombly).
184
The Supreme Court itself reiterates, in a fashion almost scolding district judges, that pleading
standards may only be established through rulemaking procedures. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 224
(2007) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics, 507 U.S. 163 (1993)); Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S.
573 (2006); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
185
See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 8, at 823 ("[T]hey have destabilized the entire system of civil
litigation."). In light of the Iqbal decision, it is interesting to examine the Supreme Court's prior sentiment that
it was wrong for courts to adopt different pleading rules on a "case-by-case basis." SeeJones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
199, 224 (2007). With the advent of Iqbal plausibility pleading, a district court judge must make
determinations about a complaint's factual nature on a case-by-case basis. Since the sufficiency ofa complaint
will be largely controlled by the judge's interpretation of facts and their sufficiency vis-'-vis a stated cause of
action, the Supreme Court has essentially mandated that pleading be determined on a case-by-case basis. To
grant a judge the latitude to determine pleading standards in individual cases in his docket is to allow precisely
what the Supreme Court cautioned about in Jones v. Bock. See id
181
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hallmark of the rule-making process is the long and well-thought out
collaboration of many minds from various fields in order to curtail the
destabilizing effects brought on by an abrupt change to a far-reaching
system.
Not only was the Iqbal decision rash, but the panel of justices who
decided Iqbal were wholly unfamiliar with the intricacies of the trial
process. To put it bluntly, they were simply unqualified to determine
practicalities of pre-trial practice."s' The Iqbal decision made sweeping
reforms without an adequate understanding of the effects of the new
gatekeeping role in practical litigation process. The Supreme Court
adopted a pleading device that was limited to antitrust suits and developed
by the Second Circuit, where it had minimal success.' This judge-made
form of rule-making provides for haphazard manipulation of procedural
rules to suit the particular case at bar,' 8 which is particularly apparent in
the post-9/11 atmosphere. Conversely, the rules-making process ensures
that "notice, comment, and a good deal of consultation among bench and
bar will precede significant . .. procedural change.""
VI. CONCLUSION

State appellate courts will soon be met with thorough briefs of
defendants attempting to take advantage of the heightened pleading
standard. Since the advent of plausibility pleading, the largest increase of
dismissals have come against civil rights claimants.'" This is troubling,
considering that the federal courts are the traditional forum for litigating
civil rights cases.191
See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 8, at 851 ("Only Justice Souter had ever sat on a trial bench,
and he did so in the non-Federal Rules state of New Hampshire.").
187
See id. at 852.
188
"[The plausibility] standard is certainly dependent on the legal and factual context of a given
controversy and since it would seem to require a judge to make a value determination on the likelihood of
whether a claim will ultimately succeed or not before meaningful discovery occurs, even if the law provides a
remedy for the conduct alleged. Furthermore, I am uncertain how predictable the current federal standard
may be given that each judge has a different level of experience in making such determinations. I believe we
must also be weary of a procedure which could be harsh on pm se litigants or otherwise be viewed as imposing
unnecessary hurdles at the courthouse door to the substantial rights of parties." Roth v. DeFeiceCare, Inc.,
700 SE.2d 183,197 (W.Va. 2010) (Benjamin, J., dissenting).
189
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 8, at 846.
9
See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Tusmbly and Employment Discrimination,2011 U. ILL. L
186

REv. 215 (2011).
11
The biases of local officials at the state level were thought to poison the litigation of civil rights in
state court, since the state actors violating litigants rights were typically connected with the judicial process at
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W~hile it is true that the state courts have been the primary forum for
the redress of wrongs for the majority of parties bringing civil actions, this
is largely due to the jurisdictional bars that dramatically restrict access to
the federal courts.'" However, the requirements that Iqbal places on a
plaintiff creates an entirely new bar to federal court adjudication.
One major hallmark of the federal courts following the
Reconstruction Amendments, and later the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was
predicated on the inadequacy of state courts in which to vindicate federal
However, there is now a predicament for plaintiffs filing
civil rights.'
civil rights claims in post-Iqbal era because the federal courts' heightened
pleading standard makes them an uncertain venue, particularly where a
state court provides for the traditional "notice" pleading.194 Although state
courts hear the vast majority of civil actions, they may now in fact be
necessary to vindicate certain federal civil rights. States should be aware
that by adopting Iqbal there will be no forum remaining for some plaintiffs
to ever be heard, particularly, those who may not be able to plead concrete
facts rising to the level of plausibility.'
Under Iqbal's framework the "short and plain" statement of a
complaint is highly scrutinized by a judge, which allows defendants to
quite easily prevent an aggrieved plaintiff from obtaining necessary facts.
Claims that were traditionally brought in federal court are now being
squeezed out by the heightened pleading standard. The concerns that the
Supreme Court had in Brown v. Western Railway are now present in every
district court throughout the United States. The impact of Iqbal upon the
delicate system of federalism is leading to unique changes within state
procedural systems operating under jurisprudence that has traditionally
followed the federal model. The Supreme Court's new plausibility
pleading standard has disrupted civil procedure as a whole and has large
implications for civil actions in the years to come. In order to maintain a
judicial system that allows aggrieved parties consistent access to the courts,

the state level.
192
Only certain types of case are meant to be heard in a federal forum. See U.S. CONST. art. IH; 28

U.S.C. S 1331-1332 (2006).
See gnerally CIVIN &ADEGBILE, supra note 24.
See, e.g., Thomas, supra, note 190 (arguing against plausibility pleading in employment
discrimination cases).
195
If the real purpose of plausibility pleading was to allow for a more manageable system of federal
court dockets, then the U.S. Supreme Court would not entirely care if the states adjudicate federal substantive
claims because that only takes up state court dockets. States should be free to provide relief for plaintiffs under
federal law even if those actions when brought in federal court, would be weeded out through a procedural
system now with a disparate burden on the plaintiff
193
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the states play a crucial role in a procedural system, in which uniformity
should not be the goal.

